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INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship on the economics of copyright has largely set-
tled into a debate between two polar extremes.  On one side are copy-
right “neoclassicists,” who favor the expansion of copyright protection 
until it encompasses all of the present and future uses associated with 
a creative work, as well as reforms that facilitate price discrimination, 
on the grounds that innovation is best promoted if authors are able to 
appropriate as much of the value of their creation as possible.  On the 
† Professor of Economics, Vanderbilt University. 
†† Professor of Law and Communication and Founding Director of the Center for 
Technology, Innovation, and Competition, University of Pennsylvania.  We would like 
to thank Joel Waldfogel, who served as the commentator on our paper, and the other 
participants in the Symposium on the Foundations of Intellectual Property Reform 
held at the University of Pennsylvania Law School on January 16-17, 2009. 
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other side are copyright “minimalists,” who favor limiting the number 
of uses contained within a copyright so that it provides only enough 
incentive for innovation and who are generally hostile toward reforms 
that facilitate price discrimination.1
Despite the differences in their conclusions, both sides generally 
frame the arguments in largely economic terms.2  Indeed, both sides 
of the debate analyze copyright through the lens of public goods the-
ory, which Paul Samuelson was among the first to analyze with 
mathematical rigor.3  A core policy implication of public goods theory 
is that markets tend to produce too few public goods and underutilize 
those that are produced.4  In the context of copyright, the economic 
analysis has focused almost entirely on the premise that not only are 
creative works nonrival in general, but also that any number of addi-
tional copies can be produced at zero marginal cost.  In so doing, the 
current literature fails to capture the key economic features that give 
public goods their distinctive characteristics. 
Samuelson imagined that there existed an exogenously fixed set 
of public goods and pointed out that markets would not produce pub-
lic goods efficiently even if they were fully excludable.5  He derived an 
optimality condition, now known as the “Samuelson condition,” that 
requires that the level of a public good be chosen so that the sum of 
the marginal benefits derived by everyone who consumes the public 
good equals the marginal cost of production.  Thus, satisfying the 
Samuelson condition in a market context requires determining the 
marginal benefit that each individual agent obtains from consuming 
1 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 
283, 311-24, 336-41 (1996) (dividing copyright scholarship into neoclassicist and mini-
malist schools and providing an overview of their positions). 
2 See id. at 287 (noting that “[s]ome minimalist critics follow the same criterion of 
allocative efficiency as the neoclassicists”); see also James Boyle, Enclosing the Genome:  
What Squabbles over Genetic Patents Could Teach Us, in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF 
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 97, 119 (F. Scott Kieff ed., 2003) (noting that intellec-
tual property minimalists are “those most committed to the claim that only utilitarian 
arguments about the encouragement of future innovation are legitimate parts of the 
discourse” and exhibit a “hard-wired reflex” to respond to noneconomic arguments by 
“restrict[ing] their analysis to the . . . utilitarian domain”). 
3 For the seminal work, see Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expendi-
ture, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT. 387 (1954). 
4 See Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Public Good Economics:  A Misunderstood Rela-
tion, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 635, 637 & n.1 (2007) (collecting commentary applying public 
goods theory to copyright in this manner). 
5 See Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT.
332, 335-36 (1958). 
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the last increment of a public good.  Since agents are charged in pro-
portion to these benefits, they have an incentive to hide or underre-
port these benefits.  Although economists have proposed a wide range 
of potential solutions to this problem, they have largely failed to pro-
duce a practical, incentive-compatible mechanism to induce consum-
ers to reveal the intensity of their preferences.6
Reconceiving the application of public goods theory to copyright 
in this manner provides an important middle ground between the ex-
treme positions that dominate the current debate.  On the one hand, 
by underscoring that some degree of price discrimination is essential 
for the optimal provision of public goods, a more fundamental under-
standing of public good economics reveals that copyright minimalists’ 
reflexive hostility toward price discrimination is misplaced.  Indeed, it 
is quite likely that prohibiting or inhibiting authors’ ability to price-
discriminate will reduce economic welfare. 
On the other hand, the more refined conception of public goods 
theory that we propose in this context challenges the neoclassicists’ 
claim that efficient production of public goods depends on authors’ 
ability to appropriate the entirety of the surplus created by their 
works.  Instead, the Samuelson condition implies that when public 
goods are divisible (in that producers can vary the quantity of public 
good they produce), producers need only appropriate the marginal
benefit (rather than the total benefit) resulting from further increases 
in the production of public goods.  This means that some proportion 
of the available surplus remains with the consumer.7  Our approach 
thus strikes a middle ground between the polar positions that domi-
nate the debate and provides a basis for analyzing the optimal level of 
price discrimination.8
There are two additional complicating factors that make copyright 
goods a particularly difficult problem even within the context of pub-
lic goods theory.  First, the types of public goods that Samuelson had 
6 See generally Jean-Jacques Laffont, Incentives and the Allocation of Public Goods, in 2 
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 537 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 
1987) (surveying and critiquing the literature proposing mechanisms for inducing an 
efficient production and allocation of public goods). 
7 See Yoo, supra note 4, at 674-75 (noting that the Samuelson condition does not 
require producers to “capture all of the consumer surplus,” but rather that producers 
only capture “the marginal rate at which each consumer would substitute further ex-
pansion of the public good for other goods”). 
8 Note that when producers cannot vary the amount of the public good they pro-
duce, optimality may require that they appropriate the entirety of the available surplus.  
See infra Part III. 
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in mind when he developed his theory—such as roads and national 
defense—are divisible, in that one can provide one unit, two units, or 
any amount of these goods one chooses.  Copyright goods, however, 
tend to be indivisible.  That is, one can either write a book, compose a 
song, make a movie, or not do so.  One cannot write half a book or 
two units of the same book.9  Half a book (perhaps a book written 
with half the effort) would be a different copyright good, not half the 
quantity of the same good.  Thus, copyright goods involve a fixed first-
copy cost and then close-to-zero cost in allowing additional agents to 
enjoy subsequent copies, in contrast to the zero fixed costs and posi-
tive marginal cost typical of classical public goods. 
Second, Samuelson followed classical general-equilibrium theory 
in assuming that the set of public goods is exogenously fixed.  How-
ever, the major argument for providing copyright protection in the 
first place is that protection is necessary to provide incentives to pro-
duce new copyright goods.  Thus, the set of copyright goods is 
endogenously determined in equilibrium.  Economics has only a 
primitive understanding of how markets create new goods, but this is 
an issue that cannot be ignored in the context of copyright. 
The interplay of these two factors greatly complicates the problem 
and makes it difficult to make definitive policy recommendations.  In-
deed, one reason for the persistence of the debate in law is that there 
is truth in both sides of the argument.  Copyrighted works are often 
imperfect substitutes for one another.  This creates demand interac-
tions that change the analysis in important ways.  Imperfect substitu-
tion adds a different dimension along which public goods can be un-
derprovided:  not only can there be too little of a particular good, but 
markets may also produce too few types of public goods.  Perhaps 
even more surprising is the fact that if policy instruments are not cor-
rectly calibrated, it is also entirely possible that markets will provide 
too many works instead of too few.10  Thus, conceiving of the copy-
right markets as endogenously determining the set of discrete public 
9 We are thus using the term “indivisible” to refer to an aspect of public goods 
supply, in contrast to Kenneth Arrow and other leading public goods theorists who use 
the term to refer to an aspect of public goods demand. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic 
Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RESEARCH,
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS
609, 615-16 (1962); see also RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER, THE THEORY OF EX-
TERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 8 (2d ed. 1996). 
10 For a preliminary analysis of this possibility, see Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright 
and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212, 256-64 (2004) (discussing the poten-
tial problem of “excessive entry caused by demand diversion”). 
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goods to provide through a process of monopolistic competition un-
dercuts the seemingly intuitive policy inference that markets invaria-
bly tend to produce too few works.  To the extent that the relevant 
equilibrium is one in which overproduction occurs, this insight in 
turn suggests that the tradeoff between incentives for efficient crea-
tion and efficient access to those works that are created—the tradeoff 
that frames most of the scholarship on the economics of copyright—
may be fundamentally misplaced. 
The purpose of this Article is to help disentangle these effects and 
clearly highlight the factors that should guide this policy debate.11
The balance of the discussion is organized as follows:  Part I briefly re-
views the basic economics of pure public goods and summarizes the 
shortcomings of the way the debate is currently framed.12  Part II lays 
out a basic model of pure public goods and analyzes the role that 
price discrimination plays in maximizing economic welfare.  Part III 
extends the model by allowing for the possibility of competition be-
tween similar products that are imperfect substitutes for one another. 
I. A PRIMER ON PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMICS
Under the classic definition, pure public goods have two defining 
characteristics.13  First, they are nonexcludable, which means that the 
good cannot be provided to one consumer without simultaneously 
providing it to others.  That is, it is infeasible to prevent any agent 
from consuming whatever public goods are produced.  Second, they 
are nonrival, which means that the consumption of the good by one 
consumer does not reduce the supply available for consumption by 
others.
One oft-cited example of a public good is a lighthouse.  Light-
houses are said to be nonexcludable, in that it is generally thought 
that lighthouse services cannot be provided to one ship without also 
providing them to others.  The inability to internalize these positive 
externalities is said to lead to systematic underproduction of light-
house services.  Lighthouses are also said to be nonrival in that con-
11 This Article represents a formalization of ideas first discussed in an earlier arti-
cle. See generally Yoo, supra note 4. 
12 Part I recaps the descriptive account of public good economics presented in the 
article referred to above.  See id. at 643-60, 662-75.  Those familiar with the subject may 
wish to proceed directly to Part II. 
13 Id. at 637; see also Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local 
Television, 52 EMORY L.J. 1579, 1594 & n.21 (2003) (collecting sources on the origin of 
the classic definition of pure public goods). 
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sumption of lighthouse services by one ship does not preclude other 
ships from consuming them as well.  Another example is a fireworks 
display.  It is difficult to allow one consumer to enjoy a fireworks dis-
play without simultaneously allowing others to do so.  In addition, the 
enjoyment of the fireworks display by one person does not generally 
reduce the ability of others to enjoy it as well. 
As noted earlier, creative works are generally thought to be pure 
public goods.  Absent some form of copyright protection, authors 
would be unable to prevent one purchaser from copying the work and 
sharing it with others.  Moreover, the sharing of the work with one 
person does not in any way reduce the supply of the work available for 
sharing with others. 
A.  The Critique of Nonexcludability 
Interestingly, Samuelson did not regard nonexcludability as an es-
sential characteristic of pure public goods.14  A moment’s reflection 
on the classic examples discussed above reveals why.  Consider the 
lighthouse.  Metering access to a lighthouse is not impossible; it is 
simply very costly.  For example, a lighthouse owner could engage a 
flotilla of ships to intercept other ships and ensure that only those that 
had paid for the lighthouse services were able to enjoy them.  Alterna-
tively, the lighthouse could install a lamp that operated on frequen-
cies outside the visible spectrum and give only those ships that had 
paid for the services the equipment necessary to detect its signals.  In 
the context of copyright, the advent of digital-rights management is 
increasingly allowing authors to charge for uses that were previously 
nonexcludable. 
Stated somewhat more broadly, the problems of nonexcludability 
are technological rather than fundamental.  They are contingent on 
the underlying technology and may be ameliorated as the underlying 
technological context changes.  In addition, as Coase pointed out, the 
fact that port usage constitutes a useful proxy for the consumption of 
lighthouse services allowed lighthouse owners in early England to 
avoid the problems of nonexcludability simply by including charges 
for lighthouse services in port fees.15
14 See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 335 (“Being able to limit a public good’s con-
sumption does not make it a true-blue private good.”). 
15 See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 364, 375 (1974) 
(describing how tolls levied on ships benefiting from lighthouses financed private pro-
vision of lighthouse services).  For an overview and an application to Internet pricing, 
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B.  The Reconceptualization of Nonrivalry 
Similar questions have been raised about the way the literature 
has framed nonrivalry, which, as noted earlier, occurs when consump-
tion by one person does not diminish the supply available for con-
sumption by others.  The existing literature models nonrivalry in 
copyright goods by assuming that once authors incur fixed costs 
needed to make the first copy of a creative work, the work can be 
costlessly reproduced an infinite number of times.  In other words, 
the marginal cost of making copies of any existing copyrighted work is 
zero. 
The assumption of zero marginal costs in turn gives rise to the fa-
miliar pricing problem that drives much of copyright analysis.  Eco-
nomic analysis suggests that an additional copy of a work should be 
created whenever the social benefits exceed the social costs of doing 
so.  This occurs when price is set equal to marginal cost.  When mar-
ginal cost is zero, however, efficient pricing requires that price also be 
set at zero.  Of course, this generates no revenue and prevents pro-
ducers from recovering the fixed costs of producing the first copy of 
the work.  On the other hand, allowing authors to recover fixed costs 
by charging prices that exceed marginal cost creates deadweight loss 
by denying access to potential consumers even though the value they 
would derive from consuming the work would exceed the cost of al-
lowing them to do so. 
Thus, the literature generally views copyright as involving a trade-
off between providing sufficient incentives and allowing efficient lev-
els of access to the work that is necessarily second best in both dimen-
sions.  Any price that allows authors to recover first-copy costs 
necessarily reduces access below welfare-optimizing levels.  Framing 
the issue in this manner has caused some to suggest that market fail-
ure is so endemic as to be useless as a guide in determining the scope 
of copyright protection.16  Other scholars have attempted to solve the 
marginal-cost pricing problem by proposing “prize” systems under 
see Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 
1847, 1873-74 (2006). 
16 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure:  Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 975, 996 (2002) (arguing that the fact that market failure is endemic for pure 
public goods renders it a poor guide for determining which uses constitute fair use). 
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which the government subsidizes the first-copy costs and the resulting 
works are then sold at marginal cost.17
As Samuelson pointed out, institutional mechanisms that permit 
public goods to be priced at marginal cost are not sufficient to solve 
the problem.18  Instead, Samuelson focused on another feature:  the 
fact that each person who purchases the public good simultaneously 
consumes the entire output of the public good. 
When goods are rival, the efficient solution is for the price of the 
good to equal both the marginal benefit each consumer derives from 
consuming that good as opposed to some other good and the mar-
ginal cost of producing that good.  In other words, economic welfare 
is maximized at the point where each consumer faces the same mar-
ginal rate of substitution between that good and all other goods and 
that marginal rate of substitution equals the marginal rate of trans-
formation between that good and all other goods (i.e., MRS1 =  
MRS2 = . . . = MRSi = MRT for consumers 1, . . . , i).
Markets can provide these goods efficiently because consumers do 
not have any incentive to misrepresent the intensity of their prefer-
ences.  Every consumer pays the same price and signals the intensity of 
their preferences by purchasing different quantities of the good.  Once 
the market sets the uniform price, the only way consumers can at-
tempt to understate the intensity of their preferences is by purchasing 
less than their optimal quantity.  Consumers have no incentive to do 
so, since this would only reduce the utility that they would enjoy. 
The situation changes when every purchaser consumes the entire 
industry output.  Production increases not by producing additional 
units, but rather by increasing the size of the public good.  For exam-
ple, a lighthouse may be made taller or may be outfitted with a 
17 For the classic argument in favor of government subsidies of high fixed-cost, low 
marginal-cost goods, see Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of 
Taxation and of Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242 (1938).  The literature 
on prizes is much more fully developed with respect to patent law.  See, e.g., Michael 
Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 VAND. L. REV. 115, 127-70 (2003) (surveying the 
literature on patent prizes and proposing another variant).  For a similar proposal with 
respect to copyright, see Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Property Rights in 
Information:  Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, Incentives To Generate Informa-
tion, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 301, 334-44 (1998). 
18 See Samuelson, supra note 5 1, at 336 (“It is not enough in the decreasing cost 
case to come closer to marginal cost pricing in the Lerner-Lange manner, making up 
the deficits by general taxation.  As soon as decreasing cost and diversity of product 
appear, we have the difficult non-local ‘total conditions’ to determine what finite mix 
of product is optimal.”). 
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stronger lamp.  The number of rockets in a fireworks display can be 
increased.  To use an example based in copyright, the quality of a 
movie may be increased by hiring better talent, incorporating better 
screenwriting and music, and creating better special effects.  We 
should add that while it is fairly straightforward to describe increasing 
the number of rockets in a fireworks display as making the fireworks 
display “larger,” the same cannot quite be said for copyright goods.  
Better talent or higher-quality special effects does not mean that there 
is “more” movie or that the movie is “larger.”  Really, it changes the 
artistic content of the movie and, to this extent, makes it a different 
movie.  This debate aside, once the “size” of a copyright good—or in-
deed any public good—is determined, everyone must necessarily con-
sume a public good of exactly that size.19
The nonrivalry of the benefits of public goods fundamentally 
changes the optimality conditions.  Welfare maximization requires 
that production be increased until the benefits from doing so no 
longer exceed the costs.  When goods are nonrival, the incremental 
benefit of expanding the size of the public good is represented by the 
sum of the marginal benefits of all consumers (i.e., 
i
i MRT=MRS ).
20
Although every consumer necessarily consumes a public good of 
the same size, different consumers may derive different levels of utility 
from doing so.  For example, some people enjoy fireworks displays 
more, while some enjoy them less.  When everyone necessarily con-
sumes the same quantity, rather than pay the same price and signal 
the intensity of their preferences by purchasing different quantities, as 
is the case with private goods, purchasers of public goods consume the 
19 Some might assert that the fact that agents purchase different numbers of cop-
ies of particular works undercuts the claim that all agents consume a public good of 
the same size.  This argument ignores the fact that copyright only protects the creative 
expression embodied in a work and “is distinct from ownership of any material object 
in which the work is embodied.”  17 U.S.C. § 202 (2006).  Thus, no matter how many 
physical copies of a DVD that an agent purchases, the size of the creative work the 
agent consumes (measured in terms of the amount of resources used to produce the 
work) is exactly the same.  See Yoo, supra note 4, at 667 (showing how copyright dis-
tinguishes between the creative aspects of works, which are both indivisible and 
protected by copyright, and the material objects in which the work is embodied, which 
are divisible and not protected by copyright). 
20 This equation is known as the Samuelson condition.  It follows from the insight 
that the demand curve for private goods is derived by summing each individual’s de-
mand curve horizontally, while the demand curve for public goods is derived by sum-
ming each individual’s demand curve vertically.  See Yoo, supra note 4, at 662-71 (out-
lining the role of the Samuelson condition in public goods theory). 
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same quantity and can only signal the intensity of their preferences by 
paying different prices.
The key implication of the Samuelson condition is that price dis-
crimination is a necessary condition for optimal production of public 
goods.  Consider the following example:  If a fireworks firm asked two 
individuals how much they would pay to see five rockets, the individ-
ual who really liked fireworks might be willing to pay a price of $3 per 
rocket, whereas the other individual might only be willing to pay $2 
per rocket.  Since rockets are nonrival, the firm need only fire five 
rockets altogether to satisfy both individuals, and the aggregate bene-
fit of firing off the five rockets is $5 per rocket.  Under uniform pric-
ing, a profit maximizer would set the price at $2 per rocket and earn a 
revenue of $4 per rocket.  If the cost per rocket were $4 or less, the 
fireworks display would enhance welfare and thus would occur.  If, 
however, the cost per rocket were between $4 and $5, uniform pricing 
would not provide sufficient revenue to cover the cost of the fireworks 
display even though its benefits would exceed its costs.  On the other 
hand, if price discrimination were permitted, the fireworks operator 
could charge the first consumer $3 per rocket and the second con-
sumer $2 per rocket, which in turn would generate sufficient revenue 
for the welfare-generating fireworks display to occur.  Thus, prevent-
ing price discrimination causes a systematic underproduction of pub-
lic goods, while facilitating price discrimination can help promote the 
creation of more welfare-enhancing public goods. 
A more fundamental problem posed by public goods is that there 
is no practical, real-world, incentive-compatible way to induce con-
sumers to use prices to signal the intensity of their preferences.  The 
nonrivalry of the benefit combined with producers’ inability to verify 
the true marginal benefit each consumer derives gives consumers the 
strategic incentive to understate the intensity of their preferences in 
the hopes that some other consumer will incur the costs needed to in-
crease the size of the public good.  In fact, reporting no benefit and 
free riding on the public contributions of others appears to be a 
dominant strategy in most cases.21
21 See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 334, 336 (noting that because public goods “si-
multaneously enter into many persons’ indifference curves,” rational actors will “hide 
their desires for public goods” and “dissemble, trying to mask [their] preference[s] for 
the public goods and to engage in other game-strategy maneuvers which, when all do 
them, will necessarily involve deadweight loss to society”); Samuelson, supra note 3, at 
388-89 (“[I]t is in the selfish interest of each person to give false signals, to pretend to 
have less interest in a given collective consumption activity than he really has . . . .”).  
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Stated somewhat more formally, with uniform pricing it is eco-
nomically rational for any particular individual to increase her con-
sumption only until the marginal benefit she derives (i.e., her individ-
ual marginal rate of substitution) equals the marginal cost (i.e., the 
marginal rate of transformation).  Optimality, however, requires that 
the level of production of a public good be based not on any one indi-
vidual’s marginal rate of substitution, but rather on the sum of the 
marginal rates of substitution of every individual.  The lack of incen-
tive for any individual to take into account the marginal benefits de-
rived by others represents the true source of systematic bias toward 
underproduction associated with public goods.  Indeed, as Samuelson 
noted, this bias will exist even if the public good is fully excludable 
and is priced at marginal cost.22
II. A FORMAL MODEL OF PURE PUBLIC GOODS
The insights of the foregoing discussion can be captured more 
formally by the following model:  Assume the economy consists of one 
private good x ; N public goods Ny , . . . , y 1 ; I individual agents with util-
ity functions i i i iNU x , y y1( , . . . , )  and endowment of private good  
i 1 for Ii ,...1,= ; and one firm with production function 
0=),...,( 1 nyyx,F .  The social planner’s problem is to choose an al-
location of public goods and private goods for each agent that maxi-
mizes a welfare function that weighs the implied utility levels received 
Interestingly, even if each consumer takes the amounts that others will contribute for a 
public good as given, it will sometimes be rational for some agents to contribute some 
positive amount toward the provision of the public good.  These contributions, while 
positive, will be well below socially optimal levels.  See Theodore Bergstrom, Lawrence 
Blume & Hal Varian, On the Private Provision of Public Goods, 29 J. PUB. ECON. 25, 25 
(1986) (noting that while instances of voluntary contributions occur, pure public 
goods would be undersupplied by these alone); Peter G. Warr, The Private Provision of a 
Public Good Is Independent of the Distribution of Income, 13 ECON. LETTERS 207, 207 (1983) 
(“When a public good is voluntarily provided, the level of its provision will typically be 
sub-optimal from a welfare standpoint.”).  As a result, the literature sometimes refers 
to this effect as “easy riding” rather than “free riding.”  See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER,
supra note 9, at 30 (noting that the fact that agents do make some contribution makes 
“easy riding” a better description of the suboptimality associated with public goods 
than “free riding”). 
22 See Samuelson, supra note 5, at 335 (using the example of subscription televi-
sion broadcasting to demonstrate that converting a public good into a private good 
does not result in optimal production, as returns in consumption are not a scaled 
function of cost; rather, the marginal cost of one additional individual tuning in is 
zero). 
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by different agents and combines them into a social aggregate.  The 
social planner’s problem is thus: 
I I I
N NN
I
x , . . . , x , y , . . . , y , y , . . . , y , . . . , y , . . . , yMax W U , . . . ,U1 1 1 2 21 11
1( )  such that 
iixx =
,,...1,== Iiyy inn  and Nn ,...1,=
0=),...,,( 1 NyyxF
The first condition requires that the net production equal the net 
consumption of private good.  The second condition says that all 
agents consume the total amount produced of each public good.  The 
third condition establishes that the production plan is feasible. 
The production function gives the net private good surplus or 
deficit associated with any given production plan.  Typically these 
plans involve negative private good components (since the private 
good is an input) and positive levels of public goods (since these are 
outputs).  If the production function takes a value of zero, then the 
plan is feasible and the requested inputs are sufficient to produce the 
planned outputs. 
The private good is purely rival.  Thus, the sum of net consump-
tion over all the agents (what each consumes less what each is en-
dowed with) must equal exactly the net production of each private 
good.  Since net production will generally be negative, the average 
agent will consume less private good than that with which the agent 
was originally endowed.  The public goods, on the other hand, are 
purely nonrival.  Thus, each agent consumes exactly the total produc-
tion of each public good. 
This approach requires the statement of a welfare function that 
weighs the well-being of each agent against that of all the others.  For-
tunately, it turns out that, for the major result, this interpersonal util-
ity comparison is not necessary.  We set this up as a constrained opti-
mization using the method of the Lagrange multiplier.  After some 
simple manipulation of the resulting first-order conditions we get the 
following:
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The first condition is the Samuelson condition.  It requires that, 
for a nonrival good, production should increase until the sum of the 
marginal benefits (or the marginal rates of substitution of public for 
private good) across all agents equals the marginal cost (or the mar-
ginal rate of transformation of public for private good).  The 
Samuelson rule is a necessary condition that must be satisfied by any 
Pareto-optimal allocation. 
To ensure full social optimality, we must also consider the second 
condition.  This is quite straightforward:  W/ Ui is the incremental 
social welfare that giving one more unit of utility to agent i produces 
for the society.  On the other hand, Ui/ Xi is the incremental utility 
that giving one more unit of private good to agent i produces.  Thus, 
( W/ Ui)( U
i/ Xi ) is the incremental social welfare produced by giv-
ing agent i one more unit of private good.   
 The equation, therefore, says to distribute the private good across 
agents such that the social welfare produced on the margin from pri-
vate good consumption is equated over all agents.  Of course, there is 
no need for a similar distributional equation for public goods since all 
agents consume the total level of public good produced.  In other 
words, structurally, there is never a distributional issue for public 
goods.
Achieving a full social optimum requires stating a social welfare 
function that explicitly weighs one agent’s utility against the others’.  
This is a difficult exercise to imagine in the real world, but fortunately 
it is not important for our current objectives.  The Samuelson condi-
tion holds independently of the welfare function or particular cardi-
nalization of preferences chosen when the utility functions are stated.  
Of course, it also holds in more complex economies with many firms 
and many private goods. 
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A.  Perfect Price Discrimination 
We now turn to the more interesting question of how to imple-
ment a Pareto-optimal allocation using a market-based approach.  
Samuelson proposed an adaptation (based on the work of Erik Lin-
dahl) of the standard notion of competitive equilibrium to an econ-
omy that includes public good.23  The notion is quite straightforward.  
As discussed earlier, for private goods, there is a single price that is 
common to all agents and all firms.  For public goods, however, each 
agent must have a personalized price that reflects her own personal 
marginal benefit from the public good. 
These “Lindahl prices” decentralize the production and consump-
tion of public goods as follows:  Suppose that the optimal quantity of a 
public good was y (that is, y is the quantity of public good that satisfies 
the Samuelson conditions above).  Then each agent would be given a 
personalized price q i for the public good and would take this price as 
given.  Just as agents do for private goods, each consumer would then 
demand a quantity of the public good such that her own marginal 
benefit equals q i (which is her personalized marginal cost).  Firms, on 
the other hand, are offered a production price of q=q i  and, taking 
this price as given, produce until the marginal cost of production 
equals the price for which they can sell the public good.  One can 
immediately see the connection between Lindahl prices and the 
Samuelson condition. 
To be a bit more formal, a Lindahl equilibrium consists of a set of 
prices I I INN N N Np q q q q q q x
1 1 2 2 1
1 1, , . . . , , , . . . , , . . . , , . . . , and an allo-
cation NIN
I xyyxx ,...,,,..., 1
1  such that  
 1.  Ii ,...1,= ,+ in
i
n
ii yqpxp  and ii yx , ,
  such that in
i
n
ii yq+xpp , iiiiii yxU>yxU ,,
 2.  0,=yx,F  and y,x  such that 0.=yx,F
n
i
nn
i
n yq+xpyq+px
 3.  i
iixx  and I,,...,=i 1  and N=n ,...1, inn y=y
23 Samuelson, supra note 3, at 387-88. 
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The first condition says that when each agent takes her personal-
ized public good price as given, she chooses an affordable level of 
public and private good that maximizes her utility within her budget 
constraint.  The second condition says that when the firm takes the 
sum of agents’ personalized public goods prices as the net price for 
which it can sell its production of public goods, the firm chooses a 
feasible production plan that is profit maximizing.  The final condi-
tion says that the supply and demand for private good are equal and 
that the amount of any given public good demanded by the agents is 
the same as the total amount produced. 
The key conclusion from this analysis is that price discrimination 
is necessary for the efficient provision of public goods and, by exten-
sion, copyright goods.  More specifically, if we declare by law that a 
single price prevail in the market, we will see losses of two separate 
types.  First, we have the familiar loss due to low-value users finding 
the price of the copyright good too high.  These users will choose not 
to buy the copyright good even though social welfare would be strictly 
improved by their doing so.  Since the good is nonrival, the consump-
tion benefits they would receive are a pure bonus to social welfare and 
impose no additional costs on copyright providers or other agents.  
Second, if some users who would be willing to make a positive contri-
bution to help support copyright good-production are discouraged 
from doing so because the uniform price is too high, many marginal 
copyright goods will not be able to cover production costs and so will 
not be produced at all.  This results in a loss of both consumer and 
producer surplus. 
In other words, even though copyright gives providers a degree of 
exclusivity, price discrimination is not per se bad for society.  Price 
discrimination both expands access and increases production of copy-
right goods.  Thus, the presumption may even go the other way.  
Moreover, the Lindahl/Samuelson approach implies that optimal 
provision depends on the producers’ ability to extract the marginal 
benefit enjoyed by all consumers.  Thus, price discrimination should 
be facilitated with respect to all consumers, not just low-value con-
sumers who would be excluded by uniform pricing.24
24 Cf. Yoo, supra note 4, at 674 (explaining that to satisfy the Samuelson condition 
the producer “must be able to price discriminate over the entire range of output” and 
calling this a “dramatic expansion of the range over which price discrimination is im-
portant”). 
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The Lindahl/Samuelson conception of efficient public good pro-
vision has two other features worth mentioning.  First, even though 
Lindahl prices are personalized (and thus Lindahl pricing appears to 
be a kind of first-degree price discrimination), consumers still retain 
surplus.  This is because Lindahl prices equal the marginal surplus 
gained by expanding the amount of the public good, rather than the 
total surplus generated by the public good.  In other words, the first 
units of public goods purchased at the personalized Lindahl price by a 
consumer yield more consumption benefit than they cost.  It is only 
the last unit of a public good that is priced at marginal benefit.  As a 
result, Lindahlian pricing is less hostile to consumer welfare than tra-
ditional first-degree price discrimination. 
Second, Lindahlian price discrimination falls on the same diffi-
culty as other forms of price discrimination:  identifying each con-
sumer’s willingness to pay.  Thus, in proposing this solution, we are 
making the point that in the best of all possible worlds, where identifi-
cation is feasible, price discrimination would result in the highest pos-
sible social welfare.  In the real world, we must consider second-best 
solutions such as those we discuss below. 
As we mentioned earlier, one objection that might be made to the 
analysis above is that it is difficult to interpret authors as being able to 
vary the size of the copyright goods they create in response to con-
sumer demand.  A book is a book, and a song is a song.  In other 
words, they are discrete products provided and consumed in an all-or-
nothing way.  On the other hand, they are still public goods since con-
sumption is nonrival. 
What are the Samuelson conditions in this case?  Suppose that we 
have an arbitrary set of potential copyright goods that could be pro-
duced.  Each of these goods produces a personalized benefit for any 
given agent and has a cost of production associated with it.  Assume 
for simplicity that these goods are neither complements nor substi-
tutes for one another.  The economy consists of a set of J potential 
copyright goods, where j  {1, . . . , J } denotes a specific good; and I
individual agents, where i  {1, . . . , I }.  The benefit to agent i of con-
suming good j is given by ijB and the cost of producing good j is given 
by .jC
The highest possible overall welfare is achieved in this model if 
each agent is charged ijB  for the use of any copyright good and if, 
based on these prices, copyright good producers make profit-
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maximizing provision decisions.  It is interesting that this is a suffi-
cient, but not a necessary, condition for Pareto optimality, which is 
the inverse of what we found for the Samuelson conditions in the case 
of divisible public goods given earlier. 
Observe that copyright producers would agree to provide good j
{1, . . . , J }  if and only if .j
i
j CB   This means that all goods for 
which social benefits exceed social costs will be produced.  On the 
other hand, all agents will choose to consume all produced goods at 
these prices since their private benefits are at least as big as the cost of 
consuming the goods.  It follows both that we have the optimal num-
ber of goods produced and that no agent who would get any benefit 
from consuming a copyright good is denied access. 
A problem here, however, is that there is no consumer surplus.  
While this does not reduce efficiency, it may be undesirable from a 
distributional standpoint.  To address this, policymakers could place 
an upper limit on the price charged for access to a copyright good.  
This might be something like a compulsory license.  While this would 
leave the upper-end consumers some surplus, it would also reduce the 
number of copyright goods offered.  Thus, we see the traditional bal-
ance between equity and efficiency that is familiar in economics.  
However, regardless of the restrictions on the highest price allowed, 
producers would still prefer to offer low-value consumers lower usage 
prices.  This only increases firms’ revenue.  Allowing this kind of  
low-end price discrimination increases social welfare both by increas-
ing the number of users who get to enjoy a given copyright good and 
by making copyright goods more profitable and so more numerous.  
Thus, it is hard to see how a good policy case could be made to fore-
close this kind of low-end price discrimination. 
It bears reemphasizing that this type of price discrimination 
represents only one of several ways for markets to produce indivisible 
public goods efficiently.  As we noted earlier, allowing the producer to 
capture all the available surplus is a sufficient condition for Pareto op-
timality, but it is not a necessary one.  This implies that other pricing 
solutions may exist that permit consumers to retain some surplus 
while also supporting the efficient market provision of the public 
good.25
25 For one perspective on this problem, see John P. Conley & Paul J. Healy, Public 
Goods, Bounded Attention Spans and Equilibrium in the Internet Economy  
(Mar. 2008) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author), available at http:// 
www.vanderbilt.edu/Econ/jpconley/documents/PE25-internet-attention-infinite-
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B.  Imperfect Price Discrimination 
The foregoing example is limited by the fact that firms generally 
will not be able to fully identify each consumer’s willingness to pay.  
We are therefore in a second-best world.  What should be the policy 
considerations in this case?  More specifically, how intensive should 
copyright be when the objective is to maximize social welfare?  We 
might allow a copyright holder to choose a single price (and less in-
tensive copyright) or allow second-degree price discrimination with 
two prices for different classes of consumers (and more intensive 
copyright).  One might imagine that making copyrights more inten-
sive would simply permit the copyright holder to increase her exploi-
tation of consumers.  However, the structure of markets for copyright 
goods has a feature that makes it particularly likely that consumers will 
actually benefit.  Specifically, by allowing two prices, the use of the 
copyright good can be extended to additional consumers who would 
have been priced out of the market under the less intensive single-
price copyright regime. 
The following example illustrates this point.  To keep matters 
simple, we consider a demand system with five different classes of con-
sumers.  This is not essential for the example to work, but it simplifies 
the calculations.  Assume the demand system is as follows: 
Table 1:  Demand System with Five Different  
Classes of Consumers 
Number of Agents Reservation Price 
100 60 
100 50 
100 40 
100 25 
100 20 
public-goods.pdf.  The authors model a public goods economy with a continuum of 
agents in which limitations in attention span cause them to consume finite amounts of 
a finite number of public goods.  They show that while price systems that decentralize 
efficient public good provision and allow agents to retain surplus do exist, the com-
plexity of the required price system is extreme. 
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Suppose further that the copyright holder must choose one and 
only one price for her good.  Thus, price discrimination is prohibited.  
The uniform pricing solution is as follows: 
Table 2:  Uniform Pricing Solution 
Price Profit Consumer Surplus 
60 6,000 0 
50 10,000 1,000 
40 12,000 3,000 
25 10,000 7,500 
20 10,000 9,500 
The profit-maximizing decision is for a firm to set a price of 40 
and obtain a profit of 12,000.  This in turn yields a consumer surplus 
of 3000. 
Now assume that the copyright holder is able to perfectly identify 
the reservation price of consumers and that resale is impossible.  Also 
suppose that the copyright holder is allowed to employ third-degree 
price discrimination and set different prices in different markets.  Ta-
ble 3 shows every possible pair of prices and the associated profit and 
consumer surplus. 
Table 3:  Every Possible Pair of Prices and Their Associated  
Profit and Consumer Surplus 
      Price       Profit   Consumer Surplus 
60/50 11,000 0 
60/40 14,000 1,000 
60/25 13,500 4,000 
60/20 12,000 5,500 
50/40 14,000 1,000 
50/25 15,000 2,500 
50/20 16,000 6,000 
40/25 14,500 3,000 
40/20 16,000 5,500 
25/20 12,000 7,500 
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There are two profit-maximizing choices:  50/20 and 40/20.  Both 
yield 16,000 in profits and give 6,000 and 5,500 in consumer surplus, 
respectively.  Both of these give higher profits and higher consumer 
surplus than uniform pricing.  Thus, allowing a more intensive copy-
right by facilitating price discrimination has actually improved total 
welfare for all classes of agents in the economy. 
What this example is meant to show is that, in a more realistic set-
ting, it is far from obvious that policymakers should discourage price 
discrimination.  For copyright goods (which are really discretely pro-
vided public goods), price discrimination may very well improve wel-
fare.  It should certainly not be judged per se bad. 
III. SPATIAL COMPETITION/IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS
One can think of copyright goods as being bundles of hedonic 
characteristics.26  For example, many science-fiction films are similar 
in many ways (flying spacecraft, laser weapons, etc.) but different in 
others (characters, settings, plot, etc.).  J.R.R. Tolkien’s classic trilogy, 
The Lord of the Rings, inspired a whole host of fantasy novels that draw 
on similar imagery (elves, dragons, wizards, magic, etc.), but each has 
its own distinctive characteristics.  The Charlie Bone series of books de-
scribes a castle-based school where children learn how to do magic, 
but it does so with its own unique characters and a much darker tone 
than the Harry Potter series. 
Exactly how to rank, order, and compare such hedonic character-
istics is an interesting and difficult question in both economics and 
law.  Clearly goods like these are imperfect substitutes and may some-
times be so similar as to produce violations of copyright.27  Producers 
of such copyright goods often argue that copyright protection should 
be as extensive as possible.  They also engage in a wide array of price 
discriminatory practices (such as different release dates in different 
26 For the seminal works, see Kelvin J. Lancaster, A New Approach to Consumer The-
ory, 74 J. POL. ECON. 132, 134 (1966), which offers a model of consumer behavior that 
treats goods as collections of characteristics from which each consumer derives a dif-
ferent level of utility, and Sherwin Rosen, Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets:  Product 
Differentiation in Pure Competition, 82 J. POL. ECON. 34, 34 (1974), which sets forth a 
model of product differentiation based on the hedonic assumption that “goods are 
valued for their utility-bearing attributes or characteristics.”  The discussion that fol-
lows expands on earlier work.  See Yoo, supra note 4, at 687-706 (applying the insights 
of product differentiation to copyright). 
27 See, e.g., Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1329 
(9th Cir. 1983) (holding that plot similarities between Battlestar Galactica and Star Wars
raised genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment). 
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countries and at different prices, delayed release of DVDs and sales to 
cable outlets, etc.).  The policy question is, how do these practices af-
fect consumer surplus, total welfare, the variety of copyright offerings, 
and access to those works?  The answers are not as clear-cut as one 
might think. 
The potential beneficial impact of price discrimination is easily il-
lustrated within the framework of spatial competition pioneered by 
Harold Hotelling.28  Hotelling’s approach assumes that goods are lo-
cated at points on the unit interval (i.e., a line one unit long) and that 
agents are also located in a uniformly distributed manner along a unit 
line with a uniform density of one per unit length.  In the context of 
local public goods, agents have a physical location and prefer to visit 
the public facility closest to them to minimize travel costs.  Generaliz-
ing this idea to a space of hedonic characteristics means interpreting 
locations as embodying different consumption attributes of goods.  In 
this context, an agent’s location is equivalent to her most preferred 
good characteristic. 
Mapping public goods into a hedonic space allows us to begin to 
understand how consumers choose among different offerings and 
how public good producers compete with one another for consumers.  
Doing so does not turn the relevant goods into private goods.  Noth-
ing about allowing for competition among different product charac-
teristics alters the fact that each agent consumes the entire industry 
output.  Thus, optimality still depends on satisfying the Samuelson 
condition. 
The existence of hedonic characteristics introduces an additional 
optimality criterion that strikes a balance between the increase in 
fixed costs needed to establish another producer and the increase in 
utility from enabling agents to consume goods that fit better with their 
preferences.  The standard results of hedonic models are that, in equi-
librium, markets may produce too many or too few public goods.  
Thus, rather than supporting the simple policy inference that markets 
tend to produce too few public goods, these models suggest the ab-
sence of any systematic bias pointing in either direction.  These mod-
els also suggest that price discrimination may bring the equilibrium 
closer to optimality, which raises serious questions about the reflexive 
28 See Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929) (setting forth 
the seminal model of spatial competition). 
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hostility toward practices that tend to facilitate price discrimination 
exhibited by much of the current literature.29
The underlying intuitions are captured by the following example, 
in which three imperfectly substitutable copyright goods, A, B, and C,
can be produced.  There are three types of consumers ( , , and )
who have single-peaked preferences over these goods.  There are five 
individuals of each type and the surplus/willingness to pay of each 
type is given in the table below. 
Table 4:  Single-Peaked Preferences of Three Different 
 Types of Consumers 
   Willingness to Pay (WTP) 
Good A Good B Good C
Type (Agents 1-5) 6 4 1 
Type  (Agents 6-10) 3 6 3 
Type  (Agents 11-15) 1 4 6 
The figure below illustrates these preferences in the more familiar 
Hotelling/Stiglitz framework.  When an agent’s location is equivalent 
to her most-preferred-good characteristic, she loses utility if she “trav-
els” away from her most-preferred-taste location and consumes an-
other good instead. 
29 See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods, in THE ECONOMICS OF 
PUBLIC SERVICES 274, 309-12 (Martin S. Feldstein & Robert P. Inman eds., 1977) 
(showing how a Hotelling linear spatial model can lead to the socially optimal level of 
production as well as either excess or insufficient entry). 
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Figure 1:  Illustration of Consumer Preferences in the  
Hotelling/Stiglitz Framework 
Of course, each good has a production cost.  This is given in the 
table below. 
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Table 5:  Production Cost of Each Good
Good A Good B Good C
25 40 25 
Suppose that price discrimination were illegal or infeasible.  This 
would mean that the provider of each good must choose one price 
and offer this to all agents.  Also suppose that copyright scope were 
sufficiently limited such that none of these goods infringed on one 
another.
To understand how the market would work in this case, suppose 
at first that only good B were provided.  If provider B charged 6, only 
type ’s would buy the good, revenue would be 30, and profit would 
be –10.  On the other hand, charging 3 would mean that all agents 
would buy the good, revenue would be 45, and profit would be 5.  
This is therefore the profit-maximizing outcome. 
Observe, however, that provider A could enter and charge a price 
of 5.5.  At this price, type ’s would choose to purchase good A and 
give provider A a total revenue of 27.5 and a profit of 2.5.  To lure 
type ’s back to good B, provider B would have to drop her price to 
2.5 in order to match the consumer surplus of 0.5 that the -type
agents currently received from consuming good A at a price of 5.5.  
But this would only generate revenue of 15 x 2.5 = 37.5 for producer B
and so would not cover her costs of 40.  Of course producer C could 
also enter, offer a price of 5.5, and attract all type ’s. 
What we see is that there is nothing that provider B can do regard-
ing price to deter entry of goods A and C.  However, surplus with good 
B is 5(3 – 3) + 5(6 – 3) + 5(3 – 3) + 15(3) – 40 = 20.30  With goods A
and B produced, surplus is 5(6 – 5.5) + 5(5.5) – 25 + 5(6 – 5.5) + 
5(5.5) – 25 = 10. 
What does this illustrate?  Surplus is highest when only good B is 
provided.  Surplus goes down when goods A and C are also provided.  
More agents consume a copyright good when only good B is provided.  
All agents buy good B, but only ’s and ’s consume copyright goods 
when A and C are provided. 
30 Note that 5(3 – 3) + 5(6 – 3) + 5(3 – 3) + 15(3) – 40 = 5CS  + 5CS  + 5CS  + TR – 
TC, where CSx is the consumer surplus of x, and TR and TC are total revenue and total 
cost, respectively. 
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Thus, a market with free entry can actually generate excess entry 
both from a standpoint of total surplus produced and total consumers 
served.  The existence of equilibria with excess entry thus undercuts 
any policies based on the broad inference that markets systematically 
produce too few public goods.  Moreover, in markets that reach equi-
librium with too many goods, measures that increase access to works 
may actually promote optimal incentives, since the resulting reduction 
in incentives may actually promote efficiency by compensating for the 
market’s tendency toward excess entry.  When that is the case, the ac-
cess/incentives dichotomy that frames most economic analyses of 
copyright does not exist. 
This is not to say that decreasing copyright’s scope will always be 
welfare enhancing.  Suppose that A and C were copyright works that 
were derivative of good B.  Then we see the counterintuitive outcome 
that making copyright more extensive can increase access to copy-
righted works, lower prices, and raise overall welfare.31
This example is predicated on one price prevailing in the market 
place.  Let us suppose instead that we permitted perfect price dis-
crimination.  First, consider the planner’s problem.  The table below 
calculates the net social surplus for each possible combination of 
goods.
31 This example underscores how the hedonic approach provides a basis for dis-
tinguishing among different ways copyright can be strengthened or weakened.  Copy-
right can be strengthened either by adding more surplus-generating activities within its 
scope (making the right larger), by facilitating price discrimination (making the right 
more intense), or by reducing the degree of similarity required in order to support a 
finding of infringement (making the right broader).  Thus, when faced with equilibria 
in which there is insufficient entry, the optimal approach might be to strengthen copy-
right along the first two dimensions (making it larger and more intense) while weaken-
ing it along the third (making it narrower).  See Yoo, supra note 10, at 264-76 (finding 
that, under the differentiated-products approach, copyright protection that is both 
large and intense is most conducive to a competitive market for copyright). 
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Table 6:  Net Social Surplus for Each Possible  
Combination of Goods 
Goods Total Benefit Total Cost Net Social Surplus 
A   55 25       30 
B   60 40       20 
C   55 25       30 
A + B   80 65       15 
B + C   80 65       15 
A + C   80 50       30 
A + B + C   90 90        0 
Suppose that we gave copyright to the whole range of products to 
the producer of good A (or C) and permitted price discrimination.  
Even if good A charged the maximum price (WTP), the surplus would 
be 30 and all agents would consume the good. 
Suppose instead that we did not grant extensive copyright but al-
lowed price discrimination.  Suppose we started with producer A
charging each agent her WTP.  Provider C could enter and undercut 
these prices.  The lowest price producer C could set for type ’s would 
be 0.  This would give ’s one unit of utility.  Thus, producer A would 
have to set a price of 5 to retain type ’s.  What about type ’s?  Al-
though we have identification and we assume that no resale is possi-
ble, we do not have monopoly.  Thus, A and C would have to compete 
for type ’s by undercutting one another’s price.  Since type ’s would 
be indifferent between A and C, the only equilibrium price would be 
0.  How type ’s agents split between A and C is not important.  Finally 
(and symmetrically), provider C could sustain a price of 5 for type ’s.  
In summary, ’s pay 5 and consume good A, ’s pay 5 and consume 
good C, and ’s pay 0 and consume either good.  Thus, by allowing 
price discrimination but only narrow copyright, we would obtain the 
highest surplus, the lowest consumer prices, and largest market 
served.
Could provider B enter at these prices?  The highest price it could 
charge ’s and ’s would be 2 (and still give them a surplus of 1).  The 
highest price provider B could charge ’s would be 3 (and still leave 
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them with a surplus of 3).  Thus, revenue would be 35, which is not 
enough to pay for the project, and so deters this entry. 
The following table summarizes the conclusions we get from this 
example: 
Table 7:  The Result of Different Levels of Copyright Protection and 
the Presence of Price Discrimination 
Copyright  
Protection 
Price  
Discrimination 
Narrow © 
No PD 
Extensive ©
No PD 
Narrow ©
With PD 
Extensive © 
With PD 
Number of 
Copyright 
Goods
  2   1   2    1 
Consumers 
Served
2/3 All All  All 
Consumer  
Surplus 
  5  15  30    0 
Total Net  
Welfare
 10  20  30   30 
What we can observe generally is that price discrimination plus ex-
tensive monopoly will always increase access to copyright goods, al-
though it may lower consumer surplus.  On the other hand, it may in-
crease or decrease overall welfare. 
Allowing price discrimination but then decreasing the extent of 
monopoly tends to lower prices and leave more surplus for consum-
ers.  All else being equal, price discrimination always increases access 
to copyright goods.  However, without a reasonably extensive monop-
oly, price competition may make it unprofitable to provide socially 
beneficial goods.  Thus, we can get underprovision of copyright goods 
if the monopoly is not sufficiently extensive.  (To see this, make the 
trivial change of raising the cost of goods A and C from 25 to 26 in the 
example above.  The market will only sustain one incumbent, and the 
problem becomes a standard contestable-market issue.) 
1828 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 157: 1801
Disallowing price discrimination can make possible the excessive 
provision of copyright goods, but, surprisingly, can also result in more 
limited access and diminished welfare.  This is because forcing pro-
viders to charge a single price prevents providers of broadly popular 
goods from offloading a larger share of the production costs on high-
demand consumers.  This allows producers of more narrowly focused 
goods to draw off segments of the consumer base to the point that the 
broadly popular good is not profitable.  We end up with a few high-
value niche markets being served but the broad consumer base being 
ignored.
Acknowledging the possibility of demand interactions among pub-
lic goods thus belies the simplicity of the policy inferences usually 
drawn by copyright scholars applying public goods theory.  The sys-
tematic bias toward producing too few public goods disappears.  In 
addition, price discrimination may well be welfare enhancing.  That 
said, results of this type depend on a number of assumptions.  For ex-
ample, the simple Hotelling models discussed in this Article are “dis-
crete-choice” models that presume that agents only consume the good 
located closest to them.  In addition, they assume that agents’ prefer-
ences are single peaked and can be ordered into a linear spectrum.  
Furthermore, they presume that the hedonic space consists of a single 
dimension.  These models can be extended in ways that permit con-
sumption of multiple goods, multipeaked preferences, and multidi-
mensionality, but the added complexity prevents the derivation of 
general results. 
To say that these more general models do not yield general results 
is not to say that they yield no results at all, only that more parame-
terization and structure is needed on the nature of agents’ prefer-
ences and the structure of demand before any conclusions can be 
drawn.  The fact intensiveness of the analysis that results when these 
restrictive assumptions associated with simple Hotelling models are 
relaxed undercuts further the propriety of basing copyright policy on 
simple policy inferences drawn from public goods theory. 
CONCLUSION
The overwhelming majority of scholarly commentaries on the 
economics of copyright base their claims on the basic insights of pub-
lic goods theory:  that markets systematically produce too few public 
goods and underutilize those that are produced.  Moreover, modeling 
nonrivalry as zero marginal cost leads the literature to frame copyright 
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as an inherent tradeoff between optimal incentives to create works 
and optimal access to works that are created, with any feasible solution 
presumed to be necesssarily second-best in both aspects.  The desire 
to promote access without increasing incentives has also led most 
commentators to support facilitating price discrimination only with 
respect to consumers of low-value uses, who would be inefficiently ex-
cluded from the market if price discrimination were prohibited alto-
gether. 
Framing the issues in this manner has caused the existing scholar-
ship to overlook the economic features that give public goods their 
distinctive quality.  In particular, the copyright literature has almost 
entirely failed to appreciate the importance of the Samuelson condi-
tion, which remains one of the most fundamental insights of public 
goods theory.  In particular, the Samuelson condition implies that 
price discrimination is not only not necessarily harmful,  but also that, 
absent direct government subsidies, it is a necessary condition for effi-
cient provision of public goods.  In addition, it has implications for 
the scope of price discrimination, showing that it is important with re-
spect to all consumers of public goods and not just consumers of low-
value uses. 
To the extent that public goods are divisible, producers need only 
capture the sum of the marginal benefits that consumers derive from 
a public good.  This ensures that consumers retain some portion of 
the surplus while also providing a metric for determining the optimal 
level of price discrimination.  If public goods are indivisible, as is typi-
cally the case with creative works, perfect price discrimination in 
which producers appropriate the entirety of the available surplus is a 
sufficient condition for optimality, although the fact that it is not a 
necessary condition implies the existence of alternative equilibria in 
which consumers do retain surplus.  These alternatives presume that 
the producer is able to charge individualized prices calibrated to the 
precise benefit each consumer derives from the public good.  In the 
more realistic setting of imperfect price discrimination, it is still quite 
plausible that facilitating price discrimination would cause both con-
sumer surplus and total welfare to increase. 
The results become even more interesting when Samuelson’s ini-
tial approach, in which the set of public goods is determined exoge-
nously and has no demand interactions, is broadened to allow for 
demand interactions and for the number of public goods to be de-
termined endogenously.  Under such models, the systematic bias to-
ward underproduction of public goods disappears entirely.  Further-
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more, the models suggest that disallowing price discrimination and 
restricting the breadth of copyright protection may actually reduce 
both consumer surplus and total welfare and may induce excess entry.  
Although relaxing some of the strict assumptions on which the classi-
cal models are based may make for a more realistic approximation of 
markets for copyrighted works, this is achieved at the cost of adding 
complexity that makes general results even more difficult to obtain 
absent additional information on the precise structure of demand.  
The intricacy of the analysis only serves to further underscore the ex-
tent to which public goods theory fails to provide the type of simple 
policy inferences needed to provide the categorical conclusions that 
characterize so much of the copyright literature. 
